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A Rollicking Band of Pirates:
Licensing the Exclusive Right of
Public Performance in the Theatre
Industry
ABSTRACT
With ticket prices on Broadway at an all-time high, amateur
and regional theatres are the only venues for theatrical productions to
which most Americans are exposed. Licensing these performance
rights-known as "stock and amateur rights"-is the primary source of
income for many playwrights, even for those whose plays flopped at the
highest level. However, the licensing houses responsible for facilitating
these transactions frequently retain and exercise the ability to issue
exclusive performance licenses to certain large regional theatres. This
practice limits public access to particular works and restricts
playwrights' potential earnings in those works. Though this behavior
does not amount to an antitrust violation, it does violate the spirit of
copyright. The Dramatists' Guild should mandate that its members
limit the theatrical licensing houses' ability to grant performance
licenses to nonexclusive licenses only. Therefore, using the power of the
guild, which acts as a quasi-labor union of playwrights, should be
influential enough to insert this limitation into the standard-form
contracts signed by playwrights. Furthermore, the licensing houses or
individual playwrights would likely not oppose granting these
exclusive licenses, as both parties would enjoy the additional revenue
streams generated by the ability to issue multiple performance licenses.
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"Old" issues in copyright can be just as relevant as new ones.
The impact of the Internet and the application of copyright laws to
websites like YouTube and other digital content-sharing services often
dominate modern intellectual property rhetoric. As these new issues
emerge in the field, old issues become less interesting to
commentators and lobbyists, accepted as simple quirks in the system.
Dramatic pieces, among the oldest forms of copyrightable works, are
losing their relevance in copyright law almost as quickly as the
professional theatre industry is losing audience members. In many
regions of the United States, small regional or amateur productions
are the only exposure to live theatre that is financially or logistically
available to the public at large.' These smaller-scale productions,
separated into "stock" (regional professional theatre) and "amateur"
1. See Michael H. Arve, Why Community Theatre is Important to the Whole Theatre
Community, LYRIc ARTS, http://www.lyricarts.org/about-us/articles-we-love/why-community
theatre-is-important-to-the-whole-theatre-community (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) ("Community
theatre is most often the first exposure people have to a live theatre experience. But much more
importantly, if that experience is a negative one, the professional theatre has lost a ticket sale
and a future theatre patron.").
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(community or school-sponsored theatre),2 are the primary source of
theatrical entertainment for the vast majority of the country.
Moreover, stock and amateur productions serve as the primary source
of income for playwrights, who cease to earn royalties on the initial
runs of their works but continue to enjoy royalties in perpetuity each
time a stock or amateur company licenses the right to publicly
perform their play.3 Through the facilitation of licensing houses that
specialize in issuing performance licenses to stock and amateur
companies, playwrights continue to profit from their work at the local
level, even as Broadway and high-end regional productions become
prohibitively expensive.4
Only one aspect of this system threatens the viability of
small-scale theatre moving forward: exclusive licenses. At present,
regional theatres may obtain an exclusive performance license to block
off performance rights to a work within a specific geographical area for
a limited period of time, thereby restricting all rival companies within
a certain radius (sometimes up to a hundred miles) from performing
the same work until the license expires (occasionally not for multiple
years).5  Such restrictions not only avoid the potential market
competition of a rival local theatre, but also prevent smaller venues,
such as high schools, colleges, and community theatres, from
mounting the show of their choice. This restrictive behavior flies in
the face of the traditional principles of the public performance right,
the "Copyright Clause" of the Constitution,6 and the basic norms of
copyright law. Because the impact of these rules is borne by small,
usually nonprofit theatre groups, however, the legality of licensing the
exclusive right of public performance for stock and amateur
productions of theatrical works remains largely unnoticed.' Indeed,
2. See 5 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 11:31 (3d ed. 2011).
3. See generally Robert Hofler, Life After Death on Broadway, VARIETY, Nov. 20, 2009,
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118011
6 6 9 ("Joe DiPietro, book writer on 'All Shook Up,'
made a few thousand dollars in royalties during the six months the Elvis Presley jukebox tuner
ran on Broadway in 2005. 'However, I made tens of thousands of dollars from my first quarterly
royalty check for the stock and amateur rights,' says the scribe.").
4. Cf. id. ("Community theaters and high school productions don't produce the instant
big bucks of Broadway and tours, but the royalties paid to creatives, producers and investors are
pure profit, and a behemoth show can bring in $1 million to $3 million a year for decades.").
5. For an example of such a provision, see LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 2, § 11:33(7).
6. U.S. CONST., art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7. Even scholars who tackle the issue of theatrical licensing directly do not consider
the possibility of issuing an exclusive stock or amateur license. E.g., Symposium, What
Permission? A Practitioner's Guide to Copyright Licensing in Theater, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
445, 457 (2006); Douglas M. Nevin, Comment, No Business Like Show Business: Copyright Law,
the Theatre Industry, and the Dilemma of Rewarding Collaboration, 53 EMORY L.J. 1533 passim
(2004). However, Lindey lists an exclusive rights provision as part of the standard-form amateur
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the viability of an exclusive stock and amateur performance license
has never been litigated.8
Part I of this Note details the history of the public performance
right: its initial creation in England, its growth and codification in the
United States, and its contours as applied to the theatre industry.
Part II examines the process of licensing stock and amateur rights to
perform theatrical works, as well as the current problems copyright
law poses to the theatre industry. Using a test previously applied to
antitrust suits against music licensing houses, Part III explains why it
is unlikely this exclusive licensing scheme violates federal antitrust
law.9 Finally, Parts IV and V suggests two alternative solutions: the
adoption of a compulsory licensing scheme by Congress-which may
fit in theory, but is unlikely to be effected in practice-and the
possibility of remedying the problem through private contract law via
pressure from the playwrights' trade association, the Dramatists
Guild.
I. A PIRATE, HORROR! 10: PIRACY IN THE THEATRE INDUSTRY AS THE
IMPETUS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
Well, at first sight it strikes us as dishonest,
But if it's good enough for virtuous England-
The first commercial country in the world-
It's good enough for us.11
Modern American copyright law derives from the US
Constitution itself, which guarantees "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 12 While the term "author" often refers to the literal
creator of the work, the creator does not necessarily always control the
"exclusive Right" mentioned in the clause; in many cases, the rights
licensing contract. See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 2, § 11:33 ("We shall not license any
amateur group to present the Play within a radius of [50] miles of your city during the [2] weeks
preceding your first performance and [2] weeks following your last one." (alterations in original)).
8. Cf. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc. v. New Opera Co., 81 N.E.2d 70, 74 (N.Y.
1948) (holding a theatre producer did not have to pay royalties to Tams-Witmark for mounting a
production of the operetta The Merry Widow, despite the presence of a signed licensing
agreement, because the work was in the public domain).
9. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d
Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), aff'd on remand sub nom. CBS,
Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. W.S. GILBERT, THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE act 1 (1879), available at http://math.
boisestate.edulgas/pirates/web-op/operhome.html.
11. W.S. GILBERT, UTOPIA, LIMITED act 1(1893), available at http://math.boisestate.edul
gas/utopia/webopul011.html.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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ostensibly owned by creative authors are, in practice, controlled by
publishers, producers, or other businessmen who negotiate with
authors for the right to exploit their work.13 The phrase "Limited
Times" is also significant, because the US Copyright Act only protects
creative works for a statutorily mandated period of time, after which
the work enters the public domain.'4
The right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly" is one of
six exclusive rights explicitly granted to copyright owners in § 106 of
the Copyright Act.15 The other five exclusive rights include the right
to reproduce the work, the right to prepare derivative works based on
the original, the right to distribute copies of the work, and the right to
publicly display the work. 16 Like many principles of US law, the
exclusive right of public performance originated in England.' 7 After
being codified in the Copyright Act Amendment of 1856,18 the
confusing and inconsistent application of the public performance right
in the United States resulted in a bevy of litigation from playwrights,
ultimately leading to a complete restructuring of US copyright law in
1909.19 Though Congress overhauled the code again in 1976, the
public performance right, as it pertains to dramatic works, remains
fundamentally the same as it was in 1909, with the notable exception
that the various exclusive rights retained by copyright owners
(including playwrights) may not be licensed, sold, or leased
independently. 20
A. The Public Performance Right in England
Be eloquent in praise of the very dull old days
which have long since passed away,
And convince 'em, if you can, that the reign of good Queen Anne
13. While the right of termination is reserved to the creator of the work only and is
inalienable, this right will not be discussed in this Note. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
14. Id. § 302(a) (setting the length of copyright protection for works created on or after
January 1, 1978 at life of the author plus seventy years).
15. Id. § 106(4).
16. Id. § 106(1)-(3), (5). The sixth right is also a public performance right, but it applies
specifically to sound recordings performed via a digital audio transmission. Id. § 106(6).
17. See Dramatic Literary Property Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15 (Eng.); Dramatic
Literary Property Act (1833), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M.
Kretschmer, eds), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/
ausgabe/%22uk_1833%22.
18. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
106(4)).
19. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at Act of July 30,
1947, ch. 391, § 101(b), Pub. L. No. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652, amended by Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 101).
20. See infra notes 93-96.
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was Culture's palmiest day.2 1
British law established copyright for the first time in 1710,
when the Statute of Anne granted an exclusive publishing right for a
limited time to certain book publishers in England. 22 The public
performance right, however, did not come into being in England until
1833, when Parliament enacted the Dramatic Literary Property Act. 23
The Act extended the literary copyright established in the Statute of
Anne to "dramatic literary property" and conferred the first exclusive
performing right to the copyright owners of dramatic works.24 Edward
Bulwer-Lytton-an active Member of Parliament, one of the most
popular writers of his era, and the author of the Act 25-presented two
bills in March of 1833.26 The first granted an exclusive right of public
performance to the authors of dramatic works, while the second
proposed allowing smaller theatres in the city to perform formal
dramas and operas in order to destroy the monopoly established by
London's two large "patent"27 theatres.28 In arguing to extend to
dramatic authors the exclusive right to govern performance of their
dramatic works, Bulwer-Lytton explained to the House of Commons:
At this moment dramatic authors possessed no control over the use of their
property ... . A play, when published, might be acted upon any stage without the
consent of the author, and without his deriving a single shilling from the profits of the
performance. It might not only be acted at one theatre, but at 100 theatres, and though,
21. W.S. GILBERT, PATIENCE act 1 (1881), available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
patience/webop/pat06.html.
22. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see also Nevin, supra note 7, at 1535.
23. See sources cited supra note 17.
24. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15 (Eng.); 13 CORPUS JURIS § 314 n.73 (William Mack 1917).
25. E.g., Philip V. Allingham, Sir Edward G. D. Bulwer-Lytton: A Brief Introduction,
VICTORIAN WEB, http://www.victorianweb.org/authorslbulwer/intro.html (last updated Dec. 12,
2000). Ironically, while Bulwer-Lytton was arguably the greatest advocate for increased
statutory intellectual property rights in his day, he was also responsible for coining literary
phrases that became so widely used that they would be classified as unprotectable scenes a faire
today, including "the pen is mightier than the sword," "the great unwashed," "the almighty
dollar," and, most famously, "[i]t was a dark and stormy night." History of the BLFC,
BULWER-LYTTON FICTION CONTEST, http://www.bulwer-lytton.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
26. See infra text accompanying note 28.
27. At the time, the Lord Chamberlain licensed only two theatres in London (known as
"patent theatres") to perform spoken dramas. See An Introduction to Patent Theatres,
HUMANITIES ADVANCED TECH. & INFO. INST., http://www.hatii.arts.gla.ac.uk/Multimedia
StudentProjects/99-00/970298lalmmcourse/project/htmllegit.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
This right ended in 1843. See infra note 32.
28. See 16 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1833) 560-67 (U.K.); Jessica Litman, The
Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1399 (2010).
Bulwer-Lytton, as the chairman of the newly-formed Select Committee on Dramatic Literature,
presented these bills after a year of hearings in which he spoke with various theatre
practitioners and government officials about the state of the theatre industry in London. See
Litman, supra, at 1398.
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perhaps, it filled the pockets of the managers, not a single penny might accrue from its
performance, however successful, or however repeated, to the unfortunate author.
2 9
Though both acts passed through the House of Commons, the
House of Lords rejected the restriction on the theatre monopolies,
despite support by a vocal minority who advocated "a free competition
with respect to theatres."30 In 1842, Parliament revised the Dramatic
Literary Property Act, allowing a copyright holder to assign his public
performance right without assigning the entire copyright and
expanding the public performance right to include musical
compositions.31 The patent theatres' statutory monopoly would end
the following year with the Theatres Act of 1843, which granted local
authorities the right to issue public performance licenses. 32
Nevertheless, neither the British nor the US legislature ever revisited
the fundamental problem Bulwer-Lytton and the House of Lords
debate had highlighted: large, powerful theatres have the ability to
prevent smaller theatres from performing whichever dramatic works
they choose. 33  This violates a playwright's right to extract full
economic value from his work and prevents the "Progress of Science
and useful Arts" 3 4 by restricting public availability of theatrical works.
B. The Origins of the Public Performance Right in the United States
All hail great Judge!! To your bright rays,
We never grudge/ Ecstatic praise....
May each decree/ As statute rank,
And never be! Reversed in Banc. 3 5
Although Congress established statutory copyright law in the
United States in 1790, the public performance right would not appear
until 1856, more than two decades after Bulwer-Lytton's Act went into
29. 16 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1833) 560 (U.K.).
30. See 20 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1833) 271-72 ("First of all, the great theatres set
up a claim of monopoly. . . . By the 21st of James 1st, too, all monopolies were expressly
prohibited; and therefore, could they now succeed in establishing their claim, it would, in his
opinion, be at the risk of rendering themselves liable to the penalties of a proemunire.... Their
Lordships were also told, that this Bill disregarded vested rights and the rights of property.");
Litman, supra note 28.
31. See Copyright Law Amendment Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 3 (Eng.); 13 CORPUS
JURIS, supra note 24; Litman, supra note 28, at 1400.
32. Theatres Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 68 (Eng.).
33. See supra note 30.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries").
35. W.S. GILBERT, TRIAL BY JURY (1875), available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
trial/weboperaltbj03.html.
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 14:3:759
effect in England. 36 In 1856, Congress finally conferred to dramatic
authors (and their heirs and assigns) "the sole right also to act,
perform, or represent [the said composition], or cause it to be acted,
performed, or represented, on any stage or public place during the
whole period for which the copyright is obtained."37 The New York
Times, though an unabashed supporter of the bill,38 noted with
amusement the unique scene at the Copyright Office shortly after US
playwrights gained the right to register and protect public
performance of their work:
For some days subsequent to the passage of the Act Murray-street was haunted by
singular-looking men, with long hair and inky finger-nails, each with a bundle of soiled
paper under his arm . . .. All these gentlemen wore an expression of mingled triumph
and anxiety. They cast curious glances at each other, and eyed each other's bundles
with ill-disguised curiosity. The fact was, every one of the distinguished dramatists was
alarmed, lest his companion should be about to copyright a version of his play; ... and
each looked upon the rival stream with the hatred usual among members of the same
family.3
9
The unease and mistrust depicted in the Times article reflected
two fundamental dilemmas facing US playwrights in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. First, dramatic authors were largely
unequipped to interpret and navigate the complicated copyright laws
of the era. 40 Second, authors could only protect their work through
statutory copyright if they published their plays, but publishing a
play-particularly a play that became popular-made the work
vulnerable to piracy by rival theatres.41
36. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see e.g., Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 153
(1899); Litman, supra note 28, at 1403.
37. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138; see Brady, 175 U.S. at 153.
38. See Dramatic Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1856, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/
archive-free/pdf?res=9A0DEEDB1339E134BC4953DFBE6683 8D649FDE. Following passage of
the bill in the Senate, the New York Times urged the House to effect quick action as well,
declaring:
We call on the members of the House to show an equal consideration for the high
interests involved by passing this bill before the end of the present session, otherwise
it will lie with the dust accumulating on it, in that department where the awful words
"unfinished business" are inscribed as gloomily prophetic as the terrible legend that
DANTE beheld written above the gates of the Inferno.
Id.
39. Plays and Playwrights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1856, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/
archive-free/pdfres=9900E7D71339E134BC4153DFBF66838D649FDE.
40. Cf. id.
41. See Litman, supra note 28, at 1384 ("The vast majority of plays . . . were never
published . ... Playwrights in America until 1909 faced a choice of arranging to publish their
scripts to secure federal statutory protection or relying on whatever copyright protection state
courts might afford unpublished works." (footnote omitted)); Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the
Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Exclusive Right of Public Performance for Musical
Compositions, 24 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1208 (2007) ("There are innumerable
companies in all parts of the country engaged at all times in the unlawful performance of plays
to which they have no legal or moral right. The theft of successful new plays and the sale of
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Throughout the late nineteenth century, Congress made
numerous attempts to clarify and increase the dramatic protection
guaranteed to authors, specifically their right to the exclusive public
performance of their works. 42 Unfortunately, neither the courts nor
the legislature proved to be particularly effective, in many cases
increasing the confusion surrounding US copyright law rather than
clarifying it.43
The bulk of litigation concerning the right of exclusive public
performance following the Act of 1856 stemmed from the particularly
litigious nature of two playwrights, Augustin Daly and Dion
Bocicault. 44 Daly and Bocicault spent more than thirty years battling
one another over the alleged piracy of a scene in Daly's play Under the
Gaslight, in which the villain ties a damsel in distress to a set of
railroad tracks, only to have the hero rescue her moments before a
train comes roaring past.45 Though the Daly litigation clarified some
important aspects of copyright protection for dramatic authors,4 6 it
also created more confusion, as the courts seemed to spin a common
law public performance right out of whole cloth.4 7 This court-invented,
common-law right attempted to fill the gaps in the federal statute that
left authors without protection both before they registered the title of
stolen copies of the manuscripts has become a regularly organized business." (quoting AM.
DRAMATISTS' CLUB, PETITION TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW, RELATING TO THE FRAUDULENT
PRODUCTION OF PLAYS, FROM THE DRAMATISTS, THEATRICAL MANAGERS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE DRAMATIC PROFESSION OF THE UNITED STATES (1890)).
42. See, e.g., Brady, 175 U.S. at 153-54 (summarizing the changes made to US statutory
copyright law from 1856 to 1870); Rosen, supra note 41, at 1200-01 (detailing problems with
existing US copyright law in the late 19th century).
43. See Carte v. Duff (The Mikado Case), 25 F. 183, 187 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885) ("While it
is much to be regretted that our statutes do not, like the English statutes, protect the author or
proprietor in all the uses to which literary property may be legitimately applied, it is not the
judicial function to supply the defect."); Rosen, supra note 41, at 1169-78 (discussing the
inconsistent court rulings associated with the copyrightability of opera scores); see also Litman,
supra note 28, at 1409-10 ("Courts had recognized common law performance rights where
statutory copyrights were defective, but cabined them with odd limits. Few cases had arisen, and
no general rule had yet presented itself.").
44. See Brady, 175 U.S. at 149; Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1868) (No. 3,552).
45. See Brady, 175 U.S. at 149; Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133. Daly's scene would eventually
become a staple of American melodrama; pop culture enthusiasts of the last sixty years would
most likely associate Daly's "Railroad Scene" as a favorite device of the cartoon villain, Snidely
Whiplash. See generally flyingmoosedotorg, Snidely Whiplash: Bondage Practitioner, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 13, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-PhCJJwlepO.
46. See Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1137-38 ("Under the act of 1856, . . . [Daly] is entitled to be
protected against piracy, in whole or in part, by representation as well as by printing, publishing,
and vending.").
47. See Litman, supra note 28, at 1415 ("dommon law play right was a kluge. Courts
had invented it to fill gaps in statutory protection, which applied only to printed, published
works by United States citizens or residents.").
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their play, and between registration and the depositing of a full copy
of the play with the US Copyright Office. 48
The other significant Gilded Age litigation concerning the right
of public performance involved the US productions of certain Gilbert
and Sullivan operettas. 49 W.S. Gilbert (the librettist) and Sir Arthur
Sullivan (the composer) authored over a dozen wildly successful comic
light operas from 1871 to 1896 for Richard D'Oyly Carte at the Savoy
Theatre in London.50 Their works have since become the most
frequently performed set of operas of all time and are some of the only
instances of Victorian-era theatre still performed regularly throughout
the English-speaking world.5 1 Though the duo had no difficulty
securing the British copyright for their first international hit, HMS
Pinafore, countless ignoble theatre producers immediately pirated the
show in theatres across the United States. 52
The duo took steps to secure the US copyright for their next
production, The Pirates of Penzance, by premiering the show with
their primary company in New York while securing the British
copyright by simultaneously staging a "copyright performance" in
London with the running cast of Pinafore performing the piece, scripts
in hand, to an audience of one. 53 At the time, a foreign production
could only secure copyright in the United States after it had been
48. See Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1132 n.3 (creating a common-law right for authors to restrain
use of their work before publication); see also Litman, supra note 28, at 1408-09 ("[A] Copyright
Office publication listing every dramatic composition registered between 1870 and 1916 suggests
that many dramatists may have sought to register their copyrights without publishing their
scripts, despite the fact that the statute did not permit it until 1909.").
49. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 1169-78.
50. See generally Samuel Silvers, Professional Opera Companies that Regularly Perform
G&S, GILBERT & SULLIVAN ARCHIVE, available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/html/
perf grps/professional.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2009); The Gilbert and Sullivan Operas,
GILBERT & SULLIVAN ARCHIVE, available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/html/gasopera.html
(last updated July 6, 2006).
51. See The Gilbert and Sullivan Operas, supra note 50.
52. E.g., Francois Cellier, The Making of H.M.S. Pinafore, in FRANCOIS CELLIER &
CUNNINGHAM BRIDGEMAN, GILBERT AND SULLIVAN AND THEIR OPERAS (1914), available at
http://math.boisestate.edulgas/pinafore/html/making-pinafore.html ("[Richard D'Oyly Carte],
accompanied by Gilbert and Sullivan, had gone to the United States with the special object of
countermining the plots of American pirates who had been guilty of privateering the 'Pinafore'
and who would be ready, if no preventive measures were adopted, to steal in the same flagrant
manner the next Gilbert and Sullivan opera produced.").
53. H.M. WALBROOK, GILBERT & SULLIVAN OPERA: A HISTORY AND A COMMENT ch. 6
(1922), reprinted in GILBERT & SULLIVAN ARCHIVE, available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
books/walbrook/chap6.html ("The Pirates of Penzance, or the Slave of Duty was produced at the
Opdra Comique on April 3rd, 1880. There had previously been given one of those absurd
'copyright performances' at which (to secure the copyright of the work) the piece is gone through
anyhow, a placard is exhibited in the box-office, and one spectator is allowed to pay a guinea for
a seat, the amount being handed back to him at the end of the performance!").
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performed in the country by a US citizen.54 D'Oyly Carte, Gilbert, and
Sullivan were particularly diligent about policing pirated productions
of The Pirates of Penzance but were simultaneously forced to battle
sheet-music-publishing companies who recreated Sullivan's melodies
for sale as piano music. 5 5 Though case law at the time allowed these
companies to recreate a performance piece through aural recollection,
the unpublished Pirates of Penzance litigation gave the trio a brief
respite from this unsympathetic precedent, ordering an injunction on
the sale of the sheet-music book.5 6
The respite was short lived, however, as play pirates forced
Carte into litigation a mere three years later, this time over a series of
pirated productions of Gilbert and Sullivan's latest hit,5 7 Iolanthe.5 8
Incredibly, the court held that, under then-existing US copyright law,
the copyright holder of a dramatic composition had the exclusive right
to print and sell copies of his work as well as the exclusive right to
publicly perform the work; but once the copyright holder had
published his work, he lost all rights to control the use others might
make of it.59 In effect, the court held that these two rights of a
dramatic author were actually disjunctive, and the exercise of
54. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 ("[Any citizen of the United
States, . . . who shall be the author . . . of any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical
composition, . . . shall, upon complying with the provisions of this act, have the sole liberty of
printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, and vending the same; and in
the case of a dramatic composition, of publicly performing or representing it.").
55. See The Drama in America, THE ERA (Feb. 22, 1880), available at http://math.
boisestate.edulgas/pirates/reviews/USA/ustours.html ("The surreptitious companies bent on
Pinafore-ing The Pirates of Penzance are being closely watched, and measures have been taken
to sternly repress any infringement on the author's rights. Mr. Gilbert states that arrangements
have been made with legal firms in every considerable town of the United States to proceed
against every company, Manager, or Lessee of Theatre playing the piece without
authorisation."); see also Rosen, supra note 41, at 1169. The rampant piracy of the duo's earlier
work may well have served as partial inspiration for the plot of Pirates of Penzance, which
featured bumbling policemen chasing inept pirates.
56. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 1169.
57. Gilbert and Sullivan composed another operetta, PATIENCE, between THE PIRATES
OF PENZANCE and IOLANTHE, which was certainly popular in its day but, for some reason, did not
yield any litigation. See GILBERT, infra note 67 (1882); GILBERT, supra note 21 (1881); GILBERT,
supra note 10 (1879).
58. See Carte v. Ford ("Iolanthe Case'), 15 F. 439, 440-41 (C.C.D. Md. 1883).
Interestingly, it was the prodigious skill of John Philip Sousa that enabled this particular
instance of opera piracy, as he was engaged by the tour producers to recreate Sullivan's
orchestrations from only the published piano reductions. See id. at 441.
59. See id. at 442 ("[Ilt is a proposition now so well settled as to be almost axiomatic,
that, except so far as preserved to him by statute, when the composer of any work, literary,
musical, or dramatic, has authorized its publication in print, his control over so much as he has
so published, and of the use which others may make of it, is at an end. And in the present case it
could not be and it is not denied that it is the right of any one to publicly perform all that the
book contains, which would in fact be the whole opera as composed by the authors . . . ." (citation
omitted)).
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publication rights extinguished the exclusive right to public
performance.60
The litigation surrounding Gilbert and Sullivan's most
successful work, The Mikado, clarified the Iolanthe Case in a more
logical but equally unsympathetic way.61  After clarifying that
publication, in any country, only extinguishes the exclusive public
performance right at common law, the court reasoned that because
Gilbert and Sullivan (and Carte) were not US citizens, they were not
afforded federal copyright protection. 62 The trio had anticipated this
difficulty and, in response, engaged US citizen George Tracey to
register the piano reduction of the orchestral score in his own name
with the Copyright Office. 63 Nonetheless, the court held that, because
music without words did not constitute a dramatic work, Tracey had
only reserved a statutory copyright in the musical composition (and
not the dramatic work). 64 Because the copyright laws at that time
reserved the public performance right to dramatic works only-and
not musical compositions-the court held that Gilbert and Sullivan
had failed to secure the US copyright to their work and therefore could
not enjoin the play pirates from producing unlicensed productions of
The Mikado in the United States.65 The combination of sound legal
reasoning and fundamental unfairness evident in the Mikado
litigation signaled that statutory reform was necessary. 66
C. The Statutory Response to Piracy
The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent.
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, my Lords, embody the Law!
6 7
60. See id.
61. See The Mikado Case, 25 F. 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
62. Id. at 185 (holding the federal copyright laws were "enacted for the protection of our
own citizens only").
63. Id. at 183.
64. See id. at 185-87.
65. See id. at 187. Though the court somewhat weakly declared that the defendant was
not permitted to "mislead the public" into thinking the piece contained the orchestrations of
Gilbert and Sullivan, it failed to explain how, exactly, a producer presenting an unlicensed
production could avoid giving the public a false impression of the authors' endorsement. Id.
66. Copyright protection was, in fact, extended to foreign nationals in 1891, just in time
to allow Gilbert and Sullivan to protect their final two collaboration pieces, the spectacular flops
UTOPIA, LIMITED and THE GRAND DUKE. International Copyright (Chace) Act, ch. 565, §§ 10, 13,
26 Stat. 1106 (1891); see also W.S. GILBERT, THE GRAND DUKE (1896), available at http://
math.boisestate.edulgas/grand -duke/web-op/operhome.html; GILBERT, supra note 11.
67. W.S. GILBERT, IOLANTHE act 1 (1882), available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
iolanthe/webop/iol07.html.
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By the final decade of the nineteenth century, the
insufficiencies of federal copyright protection for dramatists were
glaring. Play pirates could simply factor in the statutory fine as a cost
of doing business, and touring productions moved so frequently that
even an expedited injunction hearing proved toothless. 68 The producer
of a pirated production could move the show out of a circuit court's
jurisdiction long before an injunction would issue or, in the case of a
static production, simply assign any rights associated with the pirated
production, whether legitimate or not, to a third party who had not
been enjoined in the court proceedings.69 In response, the prominent
playwrights of the era formed the American Dramatists' Club and
asked Judge Abram Jesse Dittenhoefer, one of the top theatre
attorneys in the country, to draft legislation that would protect
dramatic and operatic works more completely. 70 The Cummings
Copyright Bill originated in both houses of Congress in 1894 and
became law in 1897, strengthening protection for dramatists by
increasing statutory fines, expanding the reach of the federal courts to
issue binding injunctions across districts, and making willful
infringement a criminal offense.n The Act also extended the exclusive
right of public performance to musical compositions for the first time,
signaling the first step in what would ultimately become a seismic
shift in the lobbying interests of the copyright industry.72
The passage of the Cummings Copyright Bill in 1897
represented the zenith of the influence of the theatre lobby upon
Congress, led by the newly formed American Dramatists Club. 3
Members of the club and prominent playwrights testified at hearings
of both the House and Senate Committees on Patents in 1895 and
again in 1896, extolling the virtues of the bill, the problem of play
piracy, and the importance of the theatre industry in US society. 74
Unwilling to limit their war on piracy to the trudging waters of
Congressional committee hearings, the American Dramatists Club
also compiled and distributed a list of all then-copyrighted
performance works to theatre managers across the United States,
68. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 1200-01.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1201. Dittenhoefer, ironically, represented the pirating producers in The
Mikado Case. Id. Though Dittenhoefer was a staunch advocate for strengthening the rights of
playwrights and composers, he was also outspoken in his belief that the current copyright laws
did not adequately protect them. Id. Dittenhoefer thus chose not to represent Carte or Gilbert
and Sullivan, as he did not believe they had any current protection under the laws. Id.
71. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82.
72. Id.
73. Rosen, supra note 41, at 1201, 1207-09 (detailing the creation of the American
Dramatists Club and lobbying efforts by the club to secure passage of the Cummings Bill).
74. See id. at 1207.
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lobbied individual states to create their own statutory protection for
dramatic performance rights, and distributed a petition in favor of the
Cummings Bill.75 Despite objections from the publishing lobby, 76 the
theatre lobby managed to push the bill through.77 The American
Dramatists Club's role in this effort was vital, as a similar bill
proposed to the same Congress, but with more substantive protection
of public performance rights, died in committee.78  The only
appreciable difference between the bills was that the strong, organized
theatre lobby backed the Cummings Bill, but not the Treolar Bill.79
Never again would the theatre lobby hold such a prominent
place in the political arena. As devices for the mechanical
reproduction of music developed and vaudeville and Tin Pan Alley80
caused popular interest in music performance to explode, the
music-publishing industry, which featured songwriters working hand
in hand with publishers, grew far larger than the independent
sheet-music-publishing houses.81 By the end of World War I, it was
the music industry-not the theatre industry-that would have the
ear of Congress regarding public performance rights.82
75. See id. at 1205-08.
76. See id. at 1203-04 ("Scientific American published an editorial sharply critical of the
Senate version of the bill, and shortly thereafter the Publisher's Weekly did the same .
(footnote omitted)).
77. See id. at 1209-10 (quoting remarks made by the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Patents suggesting the Cummings Bill would likely pass due to the pressure being
placed on the committee by the "musical, operatic, and dramatic, profession, and dramatic
authors").
78. See generally id. at 1178-1200 (detailing the history and fall of the Treloar
Copyright Bill, and noting that opposition from the music publishing lobby, along with language
suggesting the bill would abrogate the 1891 act extending copyright protection to foreign
nationals, likely contributed to its demise).
79. See id.
80. "Tin Pan Alley," literally the section of 28th street between Broadway and Sixth
Avenue in New York City, refers to a group of New York City publishers and songwriters who
created music between 1880 and 1950, including George and Ira Gershwin, Cole Porter, Irving
Berlin, and George M. Cohen, who were responsible for the advent of "popular music" as we
know it today. E.g., 1 AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TIN PAN ALLEY 87
(Timothy E. Scheurer, ed., 1989).
81. See id. The primary difference between the sheet music publishers of the nineteenth
century and today's music publishing industry, which began in Tin Pan Alley, is that the sheet
music publishers would typically exploit or steal melodies from outside composers, while the
music publishing industry paid staff or freelance composers for their melodies. See generally Karl
Hagstrom Miller, Music Industry, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (2003), available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401802800.html.
82. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 1197-99; see also Litman, supra note 28, at 1417
(detailing the fall of the popular theatre industry from the end of the nineteenth century to the
end of World War I).
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D. The 1909 Copyright Act
Fold your flapping wings,/ Soaring legislature!
Stoop to little things,/ Stoop to human nature!
8 3
Federal legislators finally endeavored to revise the confusing
and contradictory copyright laws in 1909, four years after President
Teddy Roosevelt spoke to Congress on this issue.84 This streamlining
and clarification of the copyright laws retained the exclusive right of
public performance for dramatic works, and the House Report
affirmed that protection against piracy remained the primary purpose
of the provision.85
Continuing the line of reasoning dating back to the birth of the
public performance right, this explanation clarified that it was
economic considerations (the threat of piracy) rather than a judgment
about the moral rights of authors that kept the exclusive right of
public performance alive. Boucicault and Gilbert and Sullivan were
never directly involved in litigation regarding their works; it was their
producers who fought their legal battles, as, by and large, the authors
had contracted away whatever rights they had in their works.86
Indeed, the House Report of the 1909 Act justified the creation of a
compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of music on economic
grounds:
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music has
been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition, ... and
83. GILBERT, supra note 67, at act 2.
84. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 1 (1909). The House Report from the 1909 Copyright
Act contains a portion of Roosevelt's speech:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused
and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which . . . are
entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor . . . ; they
are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to
administer with satisfaction to the public. . . . A complete revision of them is essential.
Id.
85. See id. at 4 ("It has sometimes happened that upon the first production of a
dramatic work a stenographer would be present and would take all the words down and would
then turn the manuscript over to some one who had hired him to do the work or sell it to outside
parties. This manuscript would then be duplicated and sold to persons who, without any
authority whatever from the author, would give public performances of the work. It needs no
argument to demonstrate how great the injustice of such a proceeding is, for under it the
author's rights are necessarily greatly impaired. If an author desires to keep his dramatic work
in unpublished form and give public representations thereof only, this right should be fully
secured to him by law.").
86. Neither Boucicault nor Gilbert and Sullivan (as an entity or separately) appear as
named parties in the cases litigated over their works, such as Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899),
and The Mikado Case, 25 F. 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1885). Rather, their respective producers (Brady
for Boucicault and D'Oyly Carte for Gilbert and Sullivan) appear as the named parties and,
presumably, were responsible for hiring the litigating attorneys. Brady, 175 U.S. at 148; Carte,
25 F. 183.
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to so frame an act that it would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the
composer an adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same time
prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very
rights granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests.
8 7
Congress's attempt to prevent both artistic theft and artistic
monopoly is instructive, as the individual rights of authors never come
into play. After all, it was the monopolistic behavior of the music
publishing houses that spurred Congress's enactment of a compulsory
license, not the behavior of the composers themselves.88
E. The 1976 Copyright Act
[I]t is one of the happiest characteristics of this glorious country that official utterances
are invariably regarded as unanswerable.
8 9
The current version of the Copyright Act, passed in 1976 and
enacted in 1978, came about not because of any glaring inadequacies
in the legal drafting of the 1909 Act, but because of the rapid
advancement of technology that was unavailable-and thus
unaddressed-at the turn of the century. 90 Protection for dramatic
works was left more or less intact, with the legislative history of the
Act focusing more on definitions of "public performance" in the context
of television and film broadcasting.9 1 However, the Act did alter the
1909 Act in two respects directly relevant to theatrical production.
First, the 1909 Act gave the authors of dramatic works full
control over the public performance of their works-both for-profit and
non-profit-while granting authors of published music control over
only for-profit performances. 92 The 1976 Act combined these two
87. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
88. See id. at 7-8 ("It appeared that some years ago contracts were made by one of the
leading mechanical reproducing establishments of the country with more than 80 of the leading
music publishing houses in this country. . . . [U]nder them the reproducing company acquired the
rights for mechanical reproduction in all the copyrighted music which the publishing house
controlled or might acquire and that they covered a period of . .. almost indefinite extension....
Not only would there be a possibility of a great music trust in this country and abroad, but
arrangements are being actively made to bring it about. . . . A condition of affairs which would
limit the market for what the composer has to sell to one customer might be quite as injurious to
the composer as it would be to the public.").
89. W.S. GILBERT, H.M.S. PINAFORE act 2 (1878), available at http://math.boisestate.
edu/gas/pinafore/pfJlib.pdf.
90. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976) ("Since [1909] significant changes in technology
have affected the operation of the copyright law. Motion pictures and sound recordings had just
made their appearance in 1909, and radio and television were still in the early stages of their
development.. . . The technical advances have generated new industries and new methods for
the reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works, and the business relations between
authors and users have evolved new patterns.").
91. See id. at 63-64.
92. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 ("[A]ny person entitled
thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right . . . (d) [tlo perform or represent the copyrighted work
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provisions into one, eliminating the "for-profit" distinction.93 The
House Report noted:
The line between commercial and "nonprofit" organizations is increasingly difficult to
draw. Many "non-profit" organizations are highly subsidized and capable of paying
royalties, and the widespread public exploitation of copyrighted works by public
broadcasters and other noncommercial organizations is likely to grow. In addition to
these trends, it is worth noting that performances and displays are continuing to
supplant markets for printed copies and that in the future a broad "not for profit"
exemption could not only hurt authors but could dry up their incentive to write.
94
Courts had already interpreted the "for-profit" distinction quite
broadly. Justice Holmes all but abrogated the distinction in 1917 in
his opinion in Herbert v. Shanley Co., where he declared: "If the rights
under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money
is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected. . . . Whether
[music] pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit and that is
enough."95 The 1976 revision merely codified what had been common
practice for years and at the same time relegated dramatic works from
an art form worthy of the creation of a new exclusive right in 1833 to
merely one of seven categories of works granted the same rights in
1976.96
In addition to abrogating the profit distinction, the 1976 Act
also explicitly made the "bundle of exclusive rights" in § 106, including
the public performance right, available for independent sale, lease, or
license, which reversed the established judicial interpretation of the
1909 Act.97 Before 1976, the individual rights granted to copyright
holders could either be sold together or licensed separately; the 1976
Act awarded authors more control by allowing them to sell or lease
some exclusive rights while retaining others.98  The principal
functional difference between the two schemes is that, prior to 1976,
publicly if it be a drama . . . ; (e) [t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a
musical composition and for the purpose of public performance for profit . . . ." (emphasis added)).
93. Compare id. with 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006) ("[Tlhe owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, . . . to perform the copyrighted work
publicly .... ).
94. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62-63 (1976).
95. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works as entitled to the exclusive right of
public performance). Dramatic works are not even defined in the legislative history of the Act,
much less in the Act itself. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (noting that "'dramatic works' .
[has a] fairly settled meaning[|").
97. 17 U.S.C. § 201; see SAMUEL SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS 167 (1st ed. 1952) ("Any
assignment of the copyright is invalid unless all of the bundle of rights is transferred at one time
. . . . But an assignment of some of the rights included in the bundle . . . is invalid and
unenforcible [sic], except as a license.").
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 201.
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authors could only license, not sell, exclusive rights to their work.
While authors retained full ownership, they were also the only party
capable of bringing suit for infringement.99 In practice, however,
authors had very little bargaining power, so theatre managers,
production companies, or publishing houses who wished to exploit
their work for profit virtually always forced authors to sell their
work. 100
Aside from those changes, the 1976 Act continued to treat
dramatic work as an antiquity. The Act focused on adapting to new
technologies: computers and television broadcasts in particular, as
well as the more widespread use of motion pictures and recorded
music.10' Indeed, dramatic works are only mentioned twice in the
entire legislative history of the bill: first to note that "dramatic works"
would be left undefined both in the Act and in the legislative history
due to its "fairly settled meaning," and later citing "acting out a
dramatic work" as an example of "performance."102 The legislative
histories of both the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act make clear that
Congress's rationale for compulsory licensing changed from a desire to
curb monopolistic behavior in established industries (in 1909) to an
attempt to reduce transaction costs associated with emerging
industries (in 1976).103 With copyright's focus firmly shifted to
adapting to new entertainments and technologies, the theatre
industry has, for better or worse, been left to fend for itself.
99. See SPRING, supra note 97, at 168 ("A licensee therefore can not [sic] sue an
infringer in his own name for infringements of rights he holds as licensee. The licensor, i.e. the
copyright proprietor, must sue for him.").
100. Cf. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) ("An author holds a bundle of
exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, among them the right to copy and the right to
incorporate the work into derivative works. By assigning the renewal copyright in the work
without limitation, . . . the author assigns all of these rights." (footnote omitted)).
101. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47.
102. Id. at 53, 63.
103. Compare H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) ("[I]t has been a serious and a difficult
task to ... accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all
use made of his composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive
monopolies . . . ."), with H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 ("[I]t would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work
was retransmitted by a cable system. Accordingly, the Committee has determined to . . .
establish a compulsory copyright license for the retransmission of those over-the-air broadcast
signals . . . ." (emphasis added)), and H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 107 ("[T]he present [compulsory
licensing] system is unfair and unnecessarily burdensome on copyright owners, and . . . the
present statutory rate is too lou [sic]." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 90-83 (1967) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
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II. CURRENT STRUCTURE AND PROBLEMS WITH COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE
THEATRE
In other professions in which men engage ... ,
The Army, the Navy, the Church, and the Stage. . .,
Professional license, if carried too far,
Your chance of promotion will certainly mar-
And I fancy the rule might apply to the Bar ... .
10 4
With the specter of dramatic piracy firmly put to rest,
playwrights bargained for increased control over their work
throughout the early twentieth century through the Dramatists Guild
of America.105 While early efforts of the guild occasionally went too
far, constituting antitrust violations,106 today dramatic authors very
clearly own the copyright to their work and will not engage in
work-for-hire agreements.107 Though copyright law provides a
baseline by which playwrights may shape agreements with theatres
and producers to present their works, it is these agreements
themselves that create the bundle of rights each playwright enjoys
over his work. In other words, the contours of dramatic authorship
are purely contractual ones.108 Typically, under the Minimum Basic
Production Agreements crafted by the Dramatists Guild, authors
receive a percentage of weekly box office receipts for First Class
Productions1 09 while retaining full control over subsidiary rights:
movies, sound recordings, merchandise, and most importantly, stock
and amateur rights.o10
104. GILBERT, supra note 67, at act 1.
105. See generally Info, DRAMATISTS GUILD AM., http://www.dramatistsguild.com/info/
index.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). For a general history of the development of the Minimum
Basic Agreement (MBA) between the Dramatists Guild and the League of New York Theatres
and Producers from the creation of the guild in 1921 to the early 1990s, see Joel Bassin, The
Minimum Basic Agreement of the Dramatists' Guild: A History of Inadequate Protection, 25 J.
ARTS MGMT. L. & Soc'Y 157 passim (1995).
106. See, e.g., Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 650 (2d Cir. 1945) (per curiam) (holding the
1941 Dramatists Guild MBA to be an illegal restraint of trade, as the Dramatists Guild was not
a labor union).
107. Bill of Rights, DRAMATISTS GUILD AM., http://www.dramatistsguild.con/billofrights
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011). In a work made for hire agreement, an employer retains the right to
copyright the creative product produced by an employee. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
108. See Susan Keller, Comment, Collaboration in Theater: Problems and Copyright
Solutions, 33 UCLA L. REV. 891, 911 (1986).
109. Theatrical rights are unique in that they are divided into First Class and subsidiary
rights. LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 7, § 11.1. "First Class" refers to the rights and royalties
associated with the original Broadway production (along with first-class tours), while secondary
rights encompass all future tours, revivals, film rights, commercial rights, and, of course, stock
and amateur productions. See id.
110. See L. Arnold Weissberger, Subsidiary Rights in the Theatre, in SUBSIDIARY RIGHTS
AND RESIDUALS 115, 125 (Joseph Taubman, ed., 1968); Keller, supra note 108, at 912-13.
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Dramatic authors hold a unique power over their work,
respective both to their peers in other industries and their theatrical
collaborators.'' Writers for television and film typically do not own
their works; rather, the scripts they create constitute works-for-hire
owned by the studio or production company. Under work-for-hire
agreements, the companies retain ownership of all rights to the
writers' works, including subsidiary rights.112 Similarly, directors,
choreographers, and designers cannot receive joint authorship status
in the work regardless of their level of contribution. Unless their
contract states otherwise, the law classifies their work as work made
for hire as well, though the model union contracts for directors and
choreographers specifically reserve ownership of the underlying
intellectual property rights in their work to the artists themselves,
and not the theatre that employs them.113  Though high-profile
directors and choreographers occasionally can bargain for joint
authorship, this phenomenon is exceedingly rare.114  While the
fundamentally collaborative nature of the theatre gives credence to
the notion that directors and choreographers should properly be
considered joint authors under copyright law, the law is firm that no
level of "sweat of the brow" work or intellectual output will compel
joint authorship of a theatrical work; authorship belongs to the
dramatists alone, unless otherwise stipulated by contract." 5
111. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 108, passim; see also Bassin, supra note 105, at 160
(contrasting the actor's role as employee of the producer with the playwright's role as
quasi-partner with the producer).
112. See Keller, supra note 108, at 914-15.
113. See, e.g., BROADWAY LEAGUE & STAGE DIRS. & CHOREOGRAPHERS SOC'Y, INC.,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT: SEPTEMBER 1, 2008-AUGUST 31, 2011 § XVIII(A) (2008)
[hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT], available at http://www.sdcweb.org/sdc/pdfs/
contractsbway/bdwyo20agmto2008-11.pdf ("[Tihe Producer and the Director and/or
Choreographer agree that ... all rights in and to the Direction and Choreography created by the
Director and/or Choreographer in the course of the rendition of his/her services shall be, upon its
creation, and will remain the sole and exclusive property of the Director and/or Choreographer
respectively; it being understood, however, that the Producer and its licensee(s) shall have a
perpetual and irrevocable license to use such direction and/or choreography in any stage
production of the play for which the Director and/or Choreographer is entitled to receive a
payment . . . . The foregoing is not intended to alter, diminish or affect, in any way, any of the
Author's rights in the play.").
114. See Choreographic Director's Guide, MUSIC THEATRE INT'L, http://mtishows.com/
resources.asp?id=63_0 1&theatricalresourceid=3 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). Agnes De Mille,
the original choreographer for Oklahoma!, Carousel, and a myriad of other popular works
publicly lamented her inability to protect her works or receive royalties. See Agnes De Mille,
Residual Rights in Choreography, in SUBSIDIARY RIGHTS AND RESIDUALS, supra note 110, at 185
passim. As the producers and authors grew rich, De Mille's original choreography was stolen
repeatedly in professional productions all over the world, even by the US government itself. See
id.
115. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201-03 (2d Cir. 1998).
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The contours of the authors' exclusive control over subsidiary
rights are less discussed, but increasingly relevant. At the height of
Broadway's popularity in the United States during the mid-twentieth
century, authors tried to make their shows attractive to production
studios, hoping to capitalize on the most lucrative subsidiary rights
available to stage productions: film rights.116 Today, however, the
landscape of theatrical rights has changed considerably; long gone are
the days when courts agreed that a starring role in a western film
would provide a far inferior financial opportunity to a starring role in
a movie musical. 117 Today, the sale of stock and amateur rights-not
the sale of film rights-has emerged as the principal money-making
vehicle for authors.118 Though stock companies, which mounted
multiple separate productions with substantially the same cast of
actors over a short time period, have largely disappeared, regional
theatres-and in particular amateur companies-have grown
exponentially. 1 9 Although no exact figures are available, around forty
thousand amateur theatre groups produce around fifty thousand
amateur theatrical productions every year, creating a lucrative
market even for works that flopped on Broadway. 120 To manage the
immense effort it would take for authors to negotiate licenses with
each company, authors lease the stock and amateur production rights
to licensing houses that specialize in those transactions.121 Presently,
six licensing houses control close to 100 percent of the market for
theatrical works. 122 Dramatists Play Service123 and Samuel French1 24
116. See Edward E. Colton, Sales of Motion Picture Rights in Plays, in SUBSIDIARY
RIGHTS AND RESIDUALS, supra note 110, at 67.
117. See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 694 (Cal. 1970)
("[Tihe female lead as a dramatic actress in a western-style motion picture can by no stretch of
imagination be considered the equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a
song-and-dance production."). If anything, the trend has reversed; new musicals are today much
more frequently based on popular movies like Catch Me If You Can, Hairspray, and The Wedding
Singer, banking on the popularity of the source material to drive initial interest and box office
sales. E.g., LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 7, § 11.1(10) ("There has also been a fairly successful
trend of creating plays from based upon famous motion pictures and/or television shows,
including motion pictures based upon preexisting books. What is interesting about the trend is
that in many cases, the demand for the play was initially created by the success of the
audiovisual work, instead of the other way around.").
118. See Hofler, supra note 3.
119. See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 7, § 11:31(4) ("If the number of stock companies
has dwindled, the reverse has been true of the amateur field. Accurate figures are not available,
but it is estimated that there are about 40,000 high school, college and university drama groups,
community theatres, drama clubs, and miscellaneous amateur producing entities (church, labor
and Armed Forces groups) scattered over this country.").
120. Id.; see Hofler, supra note 3.
121. See Nevin, supra note 7, at 1556 n.148.
122. See infra notes 125-30. Dramatic Publishing also has a substantial number of plays
and musicals available for license, but its plays are designed for production in schools and it does
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license nearly every "straight play" (drama without music) ever
produced on or Off-Broadway available for license. 125 Both also dabble
in musical theatre: Dramatists Play Service owns the stock
performance rights to several recognizable musical theatre works, 126
and Samuel French licenses a small number of low-overhead, highly
popular musicals like Grease and Chicago.127 In the world of musical
theatre, however, the hierarchy is clear: Tams-Witmark continues to
license the Cole Porter and George Gershwin musicals; 128 Rodgers &
Hammerstein Theatricals licenses the works of its namesake duo
along with the works of Lerner and Loewe (My Fair Lady and
Camelot, among others) and Andrew Lloyd Weber (Phantom of the
Opera, Evita, Cats, and many more);129 and Music Theatre
International remains the titan of the market, licensing the works of
most every successful musical theatre author not mentioned above,
including the Broadway musicals of the Disney Corporation. 130
Normally, this arrangement works quite well for all parties
involved. By leasing the exclusive right to license stock and amateur
productions of their work, authors are able to maximize revenue by
not license any works that enjoy anything resembling the profile and prestige of a Broadway
opening. See DRAMATIC PUB., http://www.dramaticpublishing.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
123. DRAMATISTS PLAY SERVICE, INC., http://www.dramatists.com (last visited Feb. 9,
2012).
124. Royalties & Rights Information, SAMUEL FRENCH, INC., http://www.samuelfrench.
com/store/royalties.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
125. See sources cited in notes 123-24; see also Kevin A. Goldman, Comment, Limited
Times: Rethinking the Bounds of Copyright Protection, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 723 (2006) (noting
that Samuel French enjoys a lucrative market in acquiring and licensing protected works).
126. See Musicals, DRAMATISTS PLAY SERV., INC., http://www.dramatists.com/text/
musicals.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) (including recent Tony Award nominees The Scottsboro
Boys and Grey Gardens, as well as cult favorites like Bat Boy: The Musical and Hedwig and the
Angry Inch, among the musicals offered for license).
127. See Chicago, SAMUEL FRENCH, INC., http://www.samuelfrench.com/store/product
info.php/productsid/2670 (last visited Dec. 22, 2011); Grease, SAMUEL FRENCH, INC.,
http://www.samuelfrench.com/store/product-info.php/productsid/6458 (last visited Dec. 22,
2011). Samuel French used to license well known plays and musicals equally, but has sold off its
license rights to many of its musicals over the years (most notably Little Shop of Horrors, to
Music Theatre International), now basing its business model off of the comparative simplicity of
well-known plays and obscure musicals. Compare, e.g., Classics (O'Neill), SAMUEL FRENCH, INC.,
http://www.samuelfrench.com/store/index.php/cPathl214 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) (showcasing
the entire canon of Eugene O'Neill works available for license), with Musicals, SAMUEL FRENCH,
INC., http://www.samuelfrench.com/store/index.php/cPathl30 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) (listing
the first hundred musicals available for license by Samuel French, with only Chicago, Chess, and
Dames at Sea readily identifiable as commonly produced musical shows.).
128. See Our Musical Shows, TAMS-WITMARK MUSIC LIBR., INC., http://www.tams-
witmark.com/musical.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
129. See All Shows, RODGERS & HAMMERSTEIN, http://www.rnh.com/shows all.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012).
130. See All Shows, MUSIC THEATRE INT'L, http://mtishows.com/show-results.asp (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012).
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increasing efficiency. Under this system, authors can profit from as
many stock companies, regional theatres, community theatres,
universities, and schools as desire to perform their works, uninhibited
by the practical difficulties associated with the actual volume of
transactions. Licensing companies earn a commission on every play
they license, and they are able to develop and cater to growing
markets by producing supplementary materials that assist amateur
companies and schools with producing the work.131 Most significantly,
small-budget theatres gain the opportunity to perform works they
otherwise would be unable to afford or access because the original
authors are either too famous or deceased.
For all its virtues, however, the stock and amateur licensing
system in the theatre has its faults. The theatrical licensing houses
have rarely faced litigation; a prohibition against charging royalties
for works in the public domain is the only judicial decision ever
imposed on a licensing house, and many of the licensing houses today
still routinely violate this simple rule. 132 Tams-Witmark still sells
stage licenses to perform some of the more popular Gilbert and
Sullivan operettas, all of which are firmly in the public domain.133
This practice is, at a minimum, a misrepresentation and may possibly
constitute fraud, yet Tams-Witmark is not alone in this behavior:
Rodgers & Hammerstein Theatricals also purports to license the stock
and amateur performance rights to the same shows.134
Other, more nuanced legal problems plague the theatrical
licensing system. Standard-form licensing agreements prevent
regional and amateur companies from editing the works in any way;
131. For example, MTI dedicates multiple pages of their website to selling theatrical
resources to make productions easier. See Theatrical Resources, Music THEATRE INT'L
http://www.mtishows.com/content.asp?id=6_0_0 (last visited Dec. 22, 2011). MTI also offers a
forum in which schools and theatres can rent sets, costumes, or props for specific productions
from one another. All Site Community Rentals, MTI SHOWSPACE, http://www.mtishowspace.com/
modladleveryone.php (last visited Dec. 22, 2011); see also Hofler, supra note 3 (describing MTI's
success in turning Little Shop of Horrors into a profitable show by creating and renting fifteen
"Audrey II" plants to community and amateur groups who had licensed the production).
132. See Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc. v. New Opera Co., 81 N.E.2d 70, 74 (N.Y.
1948) (holding a theatre producer did not have to pay royalties to Tams-Witmark for mounting a
production of the operetta The Merry Widow, despite the presence of a signed licensing
agreement, because the work was in the public domain).
133. See id.; Licensing Gilbert & Sullivan, TAMS-WITMARK MUSIc LIBR., INC.,
http://www.tams-witmark.com/musicals/gilbert.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). The operettas at
issue are in the public domain not because of the Copyright Act, but because they were never
protected by US copyright law in the first place. See discussion supra Part I.B.
134. See Shows: Gilbert, RODGERS & HAMMERSTEIN, http://www.rnh.com/shows.
html?controller=ajax&show-title=Gilbert (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
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even cutting for time or content is prohibited. 135 Directors may not
(and should not) directly copy another director's work, yet the
licensing agreements prevent them from deviating too far from the
author's intent, embodied in the look and feel of the original
production.136 Most egregiously, licensing companies have bargained
for the right to issue exclusive licenses that empower them to restrict
the public performance rights in a specific geographic area to a single
producer for as long as they desire. 137 These agreements plainly
contravene the Copyright Clause of the US Constitution because they
prevent the wide dissemination of the authors' works, thereby failing
to "promote the Progress of ... useful Arts."138  They also edge
dangerously close to antitrust violations.
III. DO THE AGREEMENTS THEATRICAL LICENSING HOUSES
PROMULGATE CONSTITUTE ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS?: THE
CBS/BUFFALO BROADCASTING TEST
And I expect you'll all agree
That he was right to so decree.
And I am right,
And you are right,
And all is right as right can be!13 9
Absent a body of case law concerning the licensing of stock and
amateur rights, the legal treatment of music licensing companies can
135. E.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Changing the Script, DRAMATISTS PLAY SERVICE,
INC., http://www.dramatists.com/faqsmanager/applications/faqsmanager (last visited Dec. 22,
2011).
136. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Creative Team of 'Urinetown' Complains of Midwest
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/15/theater/15urin.html.
137. E.g., But We're Just a High School/College/Community Theatre .... DRAMATISTS
PLAY SERVICE, INC., http://www.dramatists.com/faqsmanager/applications/faqsmanager/
index.asp?ItemID=4 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) ("You may feel that your production poses no
threat to anyone else's, but the producer holding the rights may feel differently. Restrictions
exist because professional producers and touring groups pay much higher royalties than
nonprofessionals, thus guaranteeing them exclusivity and financial 'security."'); Frequently
Asked Questions, RODGERS & HAMMERSTEIN, http://www.rnh.com/faq.html#wll (last visited Dec.
23, 2011) ("A show can be restricted as a result of any of the following: professional activity or
interest in an area, touring activity in an area, or extenuating rights issues."); What Does
"Restricted" Mean?, DRAMATISTS PLAY SERVICE, INC., http://www.dramatists.com/faqsmanager/
applications/faqsmanager/index.asp?ItemID=3 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) ("Restricted means
that the performance rights to a play may not be available to you.. . . [One] reason might be that
a professional theatre in your area is planning to produce the play, barring all other local
productions until its run has closed.").
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.").
139. W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO act 1 (1885), available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
mikado/webopera/mk103.html.
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be a useful analogy. The American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI), and the
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) protect
the performing rights to nearly all musical compositions, 1 40 similar to
the licensing structures of MTI, Rodgers & Hammerstein Theatricals,
and Tams-Witmark. The US government began pursuing ASCAP for
potential antitrust violations in 1934, but the investigation resulted in
a consent decree in 1941.141 As the result of federal antitrust
litigation, the government and the music licensing companies have
modified the decree four times since then, most recently in 2001.142
Among other restrictions, the decree prohibits ASCAP from issuing
exclusive performance licenses, interfering with the ability of member
composers from issuing nonexclusive public performance rights
directly, discriminating among license users with regard to fees, and
granting public performance rights for longer than five years. 143
Typically, ASCAP negotiates a blanket license with consumers; in
exchange for a flat fee, users may publicly perform all the works in
ASCAP's repertoire. 44 While this arrangement is often advantageous
for licensees, such as radio stations and business owners who wish to
play music in their establishments, the financial benefit ASCAP
receives from licensing all rights at once has subjected the
organization to frequent antitrust litigation.145
Critics have argued the scheme constitutes an illegal restraint
of trade, since the arrangement forces prospective license-seekers to
lease the rights to the entire library of songs owned by ASCAP rather
than only the song(s) in which they are interested.146 Consequently, in
CBS v. ASCAP, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
created a test to determine whether or not a licensing scheme of the
140. E.g., Robin Karr, Note, Blanket Licensing of Music Performing Rights in Syndicated
Television: It's Time to Change the System, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 331, 332 (1987); see also About
ASCAP, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about (last visited Feb. 25, 2012); About Us, SESAC,
http://www.sesac.com/About/About.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) ("Performing rights
organizations (there are three of us in the U.S.) are businesses designed to represent songwriters
and publishers and their right to be compensated for having their music performed in public.");
Get a BMI Music License, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
141. See Buffalo Broad. 1, 546 F. Supp. 274, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Later, the US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the same CBS test as the district court, but reversed on
the merits. Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP (Buffalo Broad. Il), 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984).
142. United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2001) (second amended final judgment).
143. Id. at *3-5.
144. See id. at *1.
145. See generally Karr, supra note 140 (outlining the history of antitrust litigation
involving ASCAP).
146. See generally id.
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public performance right is an antitrust violation. 147  Television
studios across the country initiated the litigation because they
preferred not to pay for every song in the ASCAP catalog when they
were only interested in broadcasting certain, pre-identified works.148
Further, ASCAP forced syndicated stations, when purchasing the
broadcast rights to television programs containing ASCAP-controlled
music, to license the music in those programs separately.149
On remand from the US Supreme Court, the Second Circuit
applied a two-step inquiry to determine whether ASCAP's
blanket-licensing system constituted a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.o50 First, the court considered whether the licensing
scheme had any restraining effect on trade based on the "particular
circumstances prevailing in the industry."11 If the scheme did have a
restraining effect-that is, if the licensee did not choose the scheme
from among other reasonably available alternatives-the court then
considered whether the scheme's "anti-competitive effects
outweigh[ed] its pro-competitive effects." 152 Ultimately, the Second
Circuit found that there was a financially reasonable alternative
available-namely, direct licensing-and that the blanket-licensing
system was not a restraint of trade. 153 Therefore, the court never
reached the balancing prong of the test. 154
The CBS analysis is instructive with regard to theatrical stock
and amateur performing licensing. Contractual licenses for the
performing rights to plays are subject to federal law as interstate
commerce, and thus fall under the purview of the Sherman Act. 155 Of
the two possible Sherman antitrust violations, codified in 15 U.S.C. §§
1 & 2, § 1 is the most applicable here, as it deals with restraints of
trade. 156 A § 1 antitrust violation requires (1) an agreement, (2) that
affects interstate commerce, and (3) is an unreasonable restraint of
147. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1980).
148. See id. at 932.
149. See id. at 933.
150. See id. at 932 (applying Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
151. Id. at 935.
152. Id. at 934; accord Buffalo Broad. I, 546 F. Supp. 274, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
153. See CBS, 620 F. 2d at 936.
154. See id. at 939.
155. See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 651 (2d Cir. 1945) (per curiam) ("The Supreme
Court has not hesitated to regard the distribution of motion picture films as interstate
commerce, and it may seem invidious to draw a different conclusion as to a stage production."
(citations omitted)).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006).
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trade.15 7 Theatrical productions fall squarely within the first two
requirements of the Act, as they reflect an interstate agreement
between the theatre producers and the public performance licensors,
and CBS provides a useful test to determine whether a license meets
the third requirement.158
A. Are There Other Realistically Available Licensing Alternatives?
Madam, I take three possibilities,
And strike a balance, then, between the three .... 159
There are four generally accepted licensing scheme possibilities
used in music performance: direct, blanket, source, and per-program
licensing.160 Per-program licensing is a form of blanket licensing in
which television stations pay a separate fee to the music licensing
houses only for those television programs that use copyrighted music.
Though theoretically cheaper for the television stations, the stations
must submit detailed reports of each individual program they
broadcast, to assure that the number of shows using copyrighted
music does not exceed the ratio of shows accounted for by the fee.1 6 1
Due to the excessive transaction costs associated with its stringent
reporting and monitoring requirements, television stations rarely
utilize this option.162 A per-program license would not be of much use
to musical theatre companies either, as they tend to produce only
copyrightable plays, and therefore the number of productions not
subject to royalty payments would be too small to justify a
per-program scheme. The same is true for opera companies for the
opposite reason: because opera companies generally produce only
works in the public domain, they apply for royalties so rarely that
there would be no need to arrange a per-program structure, as the
157. See id. § 1; see also Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Res., Inc., 547 F. Supp.
893, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (stating the requirements of an antitrust violation), affd, 691 F.2d 818
(6th Cir. 1982).
158. Ring, 148 F.2d at 651 ("But much more is here involved than merely an agreement
for the production of a single play; under attack is a broad plan for controlling the dramatic
productions of the country. It is clear that the plaintiff in an anti-trust suit need not himself be
in interstate commerce. It is sufficient that the combination which is the cause of his injury seeks
to restrain such commerce.").
159. W.S. GILBERT, PRINCESS IDA act 2, available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
princess-ida/webop/pi_10d.html (1884).
160. See, e.g., Buffalo Broad. II, 744 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1984).
161. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 12 (3d ed. 2002).
162. See Buffalo Broad. I, 546 F. Supp. 274, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y 1982) (noting only two out
of 750 local stations chose a per program license over a blanket license and noting the significant
reporting obligations and higher rates as potential reasons), rev'd, Buffalo Broad. II, 744 F.2d
917 (holding higher prices are insufficient to make an alternative not reasonably available unless
they are artificially inflated to prevent users from choosing the option).
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monthly transaction costs would far exceed the expense of the
occasional royalty application and fee. Companies who routinely
produce both classical works and modern copyrightable works might
find a per-program license appealing, as they would be guaranteed
access to the entire repertoire of licensable plays while simultaneously
avoiding being charged a fee for plays that are in the public domain.
Nevertheless, theatre companies choose their seasons so far in
advance that there is no risk of unpredictability in terms of the plays
they wish to license (i.e., they can adjust the plays they wish to
produce far in advance of a production date),163 and therefore there
would be no justification for the increased cost associated with a
per-program blanket license.
1. Source Licensing
Under a source-licensing system, television syndicators would
negotiate for the public performance rights to the music contained in
their programs themselves, so they would license the entire bundle of
rights necessary to air their programs to local television stations
directly rather than force the stations to pursue music performance
licenses independently. 164  This system is closest to the current
theatrical licensing scheme, as licensing companies lease the entire
bundle of rights necessary to perform a theatrical work so the
copyright owners do not have to deal with stock or amateur companies
directly. For the source licensing system to constitute a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, a prospective licensee must first show
that a direct or blanket-licensing system, as the only theoretical
alternatives, are not realistically available.
2. Direct Licensing
Direct licensing is not generally available as an alternative to
licensing through one of the theatrical-licensing houses. 165 In some
cases, professional companies are able to negotiate with the rights
holders to make certain changes to their work. However, the entire
163. E.g., Sharon Eberson, Civic Light Opera Season Balances New Fare, Classics, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/1 1292/1183051-325.stm (publicly
announcing a prominent stock theatre company's lineup of musical plays eight months before
production).
164. See Buffalo Broad. I, 546 F. Supp. at 292.
165. See generally LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 7, § 11:31(7) ("As a rule dramatists
entrust the handling of the amateur rights to agencies specializing in the business. The agencies
circulate catalogs of the plays they control among the amateur groups, and grant them licenses
to produce. . . . Since the amounts involved in the individual transactions are small,
arrangements are handled informally, often on the basis of short memoranda.").
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formation and growth of the licensing houses was based on the
premise that copyright holders do not have the time or inclination to
deal individually with rights seekers, even if they do desire to profit
from a high volume of stock and amateur performance licenses.166 A
direct-licensing system would destroy the entire concept of the
licensing houses to better reflect the wishes of the playwrights
themselves; however, the significant transaction costs associated with
individually negotiating each amateur license has made such a
scheme impracticable. 167 Further, once an author grants any sort of
exclusive license to a producer, the author loses the ability to control
that particular right, making direct licensing inapplicable.
3. Blanket Licensing
No one has ever tried to implement a blanket-licensing system
in the realm of theatre production. Under such a system, theatre
companies would pay a set percentage of their revenues (likely 1-2
percent, mirroring the blanket-licensing systems that ASCAP, BMI,
and SESAC offer for music performance rights) in exchange for a
blanket license to produce whatever dramatic works they choose over
the course of a season. MTI would likely favor this arrangement, as it
would incentivize theatres to produce shows from as few licensing
houses as possible in order to buy as few blanket licenses as possible;
the licensing house with the most number of shows-MTI-would
likely benefit the most. Such a scheme might benefit theatres who
produce a large volume of different shows each year and would
prevent licensing houses from restricting the availability of shows
from certain licensees (unless, of course, they exempted certain
popular shows from their blanket licenses). Regardless, there are no
other schemes realistically available for those who wish to mount a
theatrical work other than obtaining their stock or amateur
performance license from the specific licensing house that leases it.
The current licensing system, then, does restrain trade under CBS, so
the second step of the test applies: whether the efficiencies of the
current system outweigh its anti-competitive effects.168
166. Cf id. (noting both the small amounts involved in each transaction and the
enormous number of individual transactions per year, which would make it impracticable for an
individual author to handle stock and amateur licensing himselo.
167. Cf. id.
168. Buffalo Broad. 1, 546 F. Supp. at 286.
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B. Do the Pro-Competitive Effects Outweigh the Anti-Competitive
Effects?
Individually, I love you all with affection unspeakable; but, collectively, I look upon you
with a disgust that amounts to absolute detestation. 169
The efficiencies of the current system are evident: stock and
amateur companies gain access to the performance rights for works
they would otherwise be unable to license. Whereas it would be
inefficient for copyright owners to negotiate license terms with each
and every amateur production company independently, it is much
more practicable-not to mention profitable-to leave negotiations for
numerous small-scale licenses to licensing houses that specialize in
those transactions and charge relatively low fees. This allows authors
to benefit economically, provides a solid source of revenue to the
licensing houses, and ensures widespread public access to copyrighted
dramatic works.
There is only one major drawback to the system as it exists
today: prominent licensees have the ability to negotiate exclusive
licenses to perform particular works, and that could ultimately restrict
access to the public. 170 Whereas the consent decree between the US
government and ASCAP specifically forbids issuing exclusive public
performance rights to musical works, no such provision exists with
regard to theatrical works.17'
On balance, however, the efficiencies of the current system
likely outweigh any anti-competitive effects. Certain works are still
off-limits at any particular point in time to stock and amateur
companies in a specific region. However, a higher number of works
would be off-limits were these companies required to bargain with
copyright holders directly, since such a scheme would force companies
to deal with individual estates, not all of whom are equipped to handle
a high volume of license requests. Further, while authors would
prefer to issue licenses to as many producers as possible in order to
increase their revenues (at least when the First Class Production has
closed and their cut of the box office receipts ends), they are able to
bargain freely with the licensing houses and therefore could refuse to
allow exclusive licenses. Since authors are free to refuse to sell,
license, or exercise any of the exclusive rights associated with their
169. GILBERT, supra note 10, at act 1.
170. See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 7, § 11:31(8) ("Stock and amateur production
licenses covering non-musicals are generally not exclusive, but agents take care not to license
plays for presentation in the same locality at the same time. In the case of a musical, exclusivity
for a limited period is sometimes granted.").
171. See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2001) (second amended final judgment).
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work, 172 copyright owners are free to allow a lessee to grant an
exclusive right of public performance of their work, despite the
occasional objection by legal scholars. 173 Finally, a more thorough
analysis of the antitrust laws as applied to theatrical licensing would
likely prove fruitless; the blanket-licensing scheme that ASCAP has
adopted for music is plainly more coercive than the
theatrical-licensing scheme, yet it has managed to survive in the face
of frequent antitrust litigation. It is highly unlikely that a court
would find the theatrical-licensing houses to have violated antitrust
laws where ASCAP has been freed from similar liability.
IV. THE DRAMATISTS GUILD SHOULD REFUSE TO ALLOW LICENSING
HOUSES TO ISSUE EXCLUSIVE STOCK AND AMATEUR PERFORMANCE
LICENSES
Then came rather risky dances (under certain circumstances)
Which would shock that worthy gentleman, the Licenser of Plays.'
7 4
Other than the possibilities of direct and blanket licensing
discussed above, two additional options remain for solving the current
inequity in stock and amateur performance licensing: compulsory
licensing and contractual bargaining by the Dramatists Guild. This
Part will consider both in turn, concluding that the most feasible
option in the context of current copyright laws is for the Dramatists
Guild to exert pressure upon its members to refuse to lease the right
to grant exclusive performance licenses of their work.
A. Compulsory Licensing As a Trust-Busting Measure
I have long wished for a reasonable pretext for such a
change as you suggest. It has come at last. I do it on compulsion!
17 5
Amidst much debate, the Copyright Act of 1909 introduced
compulsory licensing as a means of preventing music publishers from
controlling the market for recorded music.176 At that time, a select few
172. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
173. See, e.g., Catherine Parrish, Note, Unilateral Refusals to License Software:
Limitations on the Right to Exclude and the Need for Compulsory Licensing, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
557, 574-75 (2002) (arguing the dictum from Fox Film had a narrow contextual meaning and
applied only to tax law). Parrish also distinguishes the Court's narrow reading of the Copyright
Act as unique to the laissez-faire economic policies of the early 1930s and unlikely to apply
post-New Deal. See id.
174. W.S. GILBERT, THE GRAND DUKE act 2, available at http://math.boisestate.edulgas/
grand duke/webop/gdl4.html (1896).
175. GILBERT, supra note 21, at act 2.
176. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7-8 (1909) ('This danger lies in the possibility that some
one company might secure, by purchase or otherwise, a large number of copyrights of the most
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companies controlled the entire bundle of rights to nearly every piece
of music protected under US copyright law, and Congress feared that
creation of a "music trust" would prevent public access to musical
works and limit the return to composers.177 In response, Congress
decreed that once an author released his work for mechanical
reproduction, he must also authorize all copying for a reasonable
royalty fee.178  Today, anyone wishing to make mechanical
reproductions of a musical work pays the Harry Fox Agency, which
acts as the clearinghouse for music copyright licensing, a rate set by
statute.17 9  This centralized collection and distribution system
streamlines the process.180
In 1976, Congress revised and expanded compulsory licensing
to include cable television,181 jukeboxes,182 and public broadcasting, 183
in addition to nondramatic musical works.184 The new compulsory
licensing schemes were primarily designed to alleviate the prohibitive
transaction costs associated with copyright licensing in new
technologies. 8 5 The statutory royalty rates are set and amended as
popular music, and by controlling these copyrights monopolize the business of manufacturing the
selling [sic] music-producing machines, otherwise free to the world. . . . Not only would there be a
possibility of a great music trust in this country and abroad, but arrangements are being actively
made to bring it about.").
177. See id. ("[lit has been a serious and a difficult task to so frame an act that it
would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use
made of his composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies,
which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose of
protecting his interests. . . . A condition of affairs which would limit the market for what the
composer has to sell to one customer might be quite as injurious to the composer as it would be to
the public.").
178. See id. at 6 ("How to protect [a composer] in [his copyright] rights without
establishing a great music monopoly was the practical question the committee had to deal with.
The only way to effect both purposes . . . , was, after giving the composer the exclusive right to
prohibit the use of his music by the mechanical reproducers, to provide that if he used or
permitted the use of his music for such purpose then, upon the payment of a reasonable royalty,
all who desired might reproduce the music.").
179. See Statutory Royalty Rates, HARRY Fox AGENCY, INC., http://www.harryfox.com/
public/StatutoryReports.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
180. See Mechanical Licensing, HARRY Fox AGENCY, INC., http://www.harryfox.com/
public/MechanicalLicenseslic.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
182. Id. § 116.
183. Id. § 118.
184. Id. § 115. See generally Midge M. Hyman, Note, The Socialization of Copyright: The
Increased Use of Compulsory Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 108-09 (1985).
185. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976) ("The Committee recognizes ... that it
would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system. Accordingly, the
Committee has determined to maintain the basic principle of the Senate bill to establish a
compulsory copyright license for the retransmission of those over-the-air broadcast signals that a
cable system is authorized to carry. . . .").
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need be by the Copyright Royalty Board, made up of three appointed
Copyright Royalty Judges. 186
Normatively, compulsory licensing for stock and amateur
performances of theatrical works would solve many of the conceptual
and practical problems the current scheme presents. Under such a
system, Congress would adopt the formulas that licensing houses use
to set royalty rates for each individual show, taking into account the
size of the theatre, length of the performance run, ticket prices, and
whether the producing organization was a professional or amateur
company.187 Moreover, the licensing houses could retain their
business model, functioning like the Harry Fox Agency does for
ASCAP; the Copyright Royalty Judges need never get involved.188
Indeed, the only effect such a scheme would have on the current
system of licensing stock and amateur performance rights to theatrical
works would be to prevent the licensing houses from issuing limited
exclusive licenses, thereby preventing some companies from licensing
certain works. Additionally, such a scheme would provide a
governmental check on the licensing houses' ability to create the same
effect as an exclusive license by charging exorbitant royalty rates that
would make performances of certain works financially impracticable
for amateur companies.
Though neither the legislature nor the judiciary have adopted
compulsory licensing in situations that did not directly involve
copyright of "new" technological innovations,189 the fact that the
scheme has continued to exist relatively unchanged (other than
increased royalty rates) since 1909 suggests that compulsory licensing
works well and is fair to both copyright owners and potential
licensees. Further, compulsory licensing would fit within the larger
normative goals of copyright, promoting the progress of science and
the useful arts by protecting the interests of both copyright holders (by
guaranteeing them royalties for their work) and the public at large (by
186. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a). See generally COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD, http://www.loc.gov/crb
(last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
187. For example, the Dramatists Play Service website contains links to several separate
amateur rights performance licenses. Nonprofessional Licensing, DRAMATISTS PLAY SERV., INC.,
http://www.dramatists.com/text/npalinks.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
188. See generally About HFA, HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC., http://www.harryfox.com/
public/AboutHFA.jsp (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
189. E.g., Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[T]he
District Court avoided ordering a cessation of business to the benefit of neither party by
compensating appellant in the form of a compulsory license with royalties. This Court has
approved such a 'flexible approach' in patent litigation." (citing Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-
Corona Marchant, Inc., 295 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1961))); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47
(1976).
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guaranteeing increased access to the entire volume of licensable
theatrical works).
Despite the virtues of a compulsory licensing scheme, such a
change in the law is unlikely. The theatre lobby has exerted very
little influence on Congress since the Cummings Act of 1897 and has
never faced new and changing technologies necessitating a robust
lobbying interest akin to that of the music publishing industry. 190
Furthermore, the lobbying interests that do exist among dramatists
are likely to support Broadway producers and dramatic artists, not the
small stock and amateur companies most harmed by the current
performance licensing scheme. Without strong lobbying, Congress is
not likely to ever effectuate such a dramatic shift in copyright law,
particularly to resolve an issue that only affects a single industry.
Instead, the theatre industry can resolve the issue the same way it
has resolved copyright ownership issues since 1897: through private
contract law. 191
B. Look For the Union Label: the Dramatists Guild's Ability to Curtail
Exclusive Performance Rights in Theatrical Productions
Hereupon we're both agreed,
All that we two
Do agree to
We'll secure by solemn deed,
To prevent all
Error mental. 1 92
Since the newly formed Dramatists Club petitioned its
members to support the passage of the Cummings Copyright Bill,
playwrights have been their own best advocates for protecting their
rights. Indeed, the Second Circuit slapped the current Dramatists
Guild (unrelated to the Dramatists Club) on the wrist for protecting
the rights of members so zealously that its behavior became
190. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 1209-10 (noting the influence of theatrical lobbying
efforts in passing the Cummings Act); Karr, supra note 140, at 356 n.191 ("ASCAP and BMI
have been leaders in involving recording artists in legislative lobbying efforts.").
191. See Keller, supra note 108, at 912 ("In commercial theater, contract arrangements
have attempted to standardize practices of allocating royalties and rights to authors from
productions of their works. For the past 20 years, the Dramatists Guild's Minimum Basic
Production Contract (MBPC) for Dramatic works and the MBPC for Dramatico-Musical works
produced on Broadway provided models for the licensing provisions of professional theaters all
over the country, most of which incorporate many or all of the MBPC's terms and conditions into
their own agreements.").
192. W.S. GILBERT, THE YEOMEN OF THE GUARD act 2 (1888), available at http://math.
boisestate.edulgas/yeomen/web-operalyeomen_15.html.
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monopolistic. 19 3 In Ring v. Spina, the relatively new Dramatists Guild
attempted to strong-arm a theatre producer into joining the guild
(thereby agreeing to a number of onerous contractual provisions) as a
contractual condition of any production agreement with a
playwright. 194 The court found such a requirement to be an
impermissible restraint of trade, as the guild never unionized.195
Increasing access (and royalties) to their works should be of
paramount importance to playwrights, as the licensing of stock and
amateur rights makes up the bulk of their income once the initial
First Class runs of their works close.196 As such, the Dramatists Guild
should make a point to include in any lease agreement between a
playwright and a licensing house that, while the licensing house holds
an exclusive right to license stock and amateur performance rights of
the playwright's work, that right does not extend to the right to issue
exclusive performance licenses. Such private contractual law has
plugged holes in copyright law before; the Society of Stage Directors
and Choreographers has long included in its standard form work for
hire contracts a stipulation that the individual artist retains all
copyright ownership of whatever intellectual property he contributes
to the production (whether direction or choreography). 197 Further, the
guild would not face opposition from a competing union, as theatrical
producers are not unionized. 198  The licensing houses do hold a
superior bargaining position over many playwrights due to the
potentially lucrative stock and amateur market. However, the
licensing houses should favor contracting away their ability to grant
exclusive licenses, as this would allow them to issue multiple
performance licenses to a given geographic area rather than being
193. See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 649 (2d Cir. 1945) (per curiam) ("Restraint of trade
is alleged to be accomplished by means of the Guild's Minimum Basic Agreement, which is [sic] a
producer or 'manager' must sign before any Guild members . . . may license or sell to him their
works.... The Basic Agreement, among other things, fixes the minimum terms under which the
Guild permits any of its members to lease or license a play, including the minimum advance
payments and the minimum royalties to be paid by a manager. It limits contracts by both
managers and authors to those made under its own terms, and between managers and members,
both of whom are 'in good standing' with the Guild. It also provides that any dispute shall be
finally adjudicated by arbitration." (footnote omitted)).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see Bassin, supra note 105, at 158. Unions are exempt from the Sherman Act,
and the guild never unionized, likely because the playwrights served as mediators between
actors and producers during the actors' union strike in 1919. See Bassin, supra note 105 at 160-
61.
196. See Hofler, supra note 3.
197. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 113.
198. See About the League, THE BROADWAY LEAGUE, http://www.livebroadway.com (last
visited Feb. 25. 2012); Bassin, supra note 105, at 158. The League of Broadway Producers is not
a union, and besides would have no interest in the Stock and Amateur Rights, as Broadway
productions only involve First Class performance rights. See Bassin, supra note 105 at 158.
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pressured to limit a performance license to a single, powerful
theatre. 199
Finally, such an advocacy position would represent good policy.
Even though tiny amateur productions generate insubstantial revenue
for an author, they expose works to a segment of the population that
may not have the financial means to attend a performance at the
premier regional theatre in the area, or the logistical means to attend
a touring production. Copyright holders will also benefit from the
increased number of performances of their work, which will yield
larger royalties and allow them to achieve greater notoriety through
increased exposure. Authors always retain the ability to prevent stock
and amateur companies from misappropriating their work; granting
more licenses would not restrict this right.200 Even those regional
theatres that routinely bargain for exclusive licenses should benefit,
as works that are now available to other local companies should
increase the marketability of the work; inferior local productions
increase name recognition of the piece and allow superior productions
to prosper.
V. CONCLUSION
Dear me. Well, theatrical property is not what it was. 2 0 1
Stock and amateur productions are the backbone of the modern
theatre industry. As the economy continues to falter and Broadway
ticket prices continue to rise, local productions are frequently the only
opportunity the public at large has to see a particular theatre piece.
The ability of regional theatres to prevent other theatres in the same
area from producing a specific play harms all parties involved. The
audience is deprived of a free market to choose among different
productions (or, perhaps, of an opportunity to see a show at all). The
playwright is denied the opportunity of increased royalties. Finally,
such an exclusive license prevents progress of science and the useful
arts. An exclusive license is a grant of monopoly that does not benefit
an author or incentivize an author to create more artistic product.
Rather, such a license benefits a licensee, who bargains with a third
party for the exclusive license and whose rights the Copyright Act
199. Indeed, this author's experience has been that, when a stock or amateur theatre
attempts to license a production that is restricted in the area, the controlling licensing house
contacts the current exclusive licensee to ask permission to issue a new license before rejecting
the application outright.
200. See Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976) ("One who obtains
permission to use a copyrighted script in the production of a derivative work . . . may not exceed
the specific purpose for which permission was granted.").
201. GILBERT, supra note 11, at act 2.
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does not contemplate. Though this practice is perhaps not sufficiently
dire to warrant Congressional action, increased union advocacy could
easily rectify the problem. Preventing select theatres from holding the
exclusive right to produce certain plays was one of the two specific
issues that spurred the initial creation of the public performance right
in 1833. Though new technologies continue to test the contours of
copyright law, it remains more important now than ever before to take
care to protect those very rights that formed the basis for the robust
copyright protection authors enjoy today.
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